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Abstract:	   McTaggart’s	   Paradox	   has	   been	   considered	   a	   special	   case	   of	   Lewis’s	   Problem	   of	  Temporary	  Intrinsics	  (see	  Craig	  (1998),	  Rea	  (2003)	  and	  Rettler	  (2012)).	  I	  argue	  instead	  that	  the	  Problem	  of	  Temporary	  Intrinsics	  cannot	  simply	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  Problem	  of	  the	  passage	  of	   time	   and	   therefore	   that	  McTaggart’s	   Paradox	   cannot	   be	   a	   special	   case	   of	   the	   Problem	  of	  Temporary	   Intrinsics.	   This	   observation	   is	   relevant	   in	   order	   to	   point	   out	   the	   difference	  between	  the	  change	  in	  objects	  or	  events	  over	  time	  (i.e.	  the	  subject	  of	  Lewis’s	  Problem)	  and	  the	  change	  (or	  passage)	  of	  time	  (i.e.	  the	  subject	  of	  McTaggart’s	  Paradox).	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  D.	  Lewis,	  J.	  M.	  E.	  McTaggart	  	  	   o-­‐o-­‐o-­‐o-­‐o-­‐o-­‐o-­‐o-­‐o	  	   	  McTaggart’s	   Paradox	   is	   notoriously	   hard	   to	   understand:	   different	   interpretations	   have	  been	   given	   of	   it	   and	   it	   has	   even	   been	   argued	   that	   it	   has	   no	   coherent	   interpretation.1	  My	  concern	  is	  not	  to	  establish	  whether	  there	  is	  or	  is	  not	  a	  correct	  interpretation	  of	  the	  paradox,	  but	   to	   consider	   whether	   a	   particular	   interpretation	   is	   actually	   an	   adequate	   account	   of	   a	  paradox	   of	   the	   passage	   of	   time,	   without	   considering	   whether	   the	   paradox	   is	   really	  McTaggart’s	   paradox	   or	   not.	   The	   interpretation	   I	   have	   in	  mind	  depends	   on	   the	   assumption	  that	  McTaggart’s	  Paradox	  is	  a	  special	  case	  of	  Lewis’s	  Problem	  of	  Temporary	  Intrinsics.2	  I	   have	   two	  main	   targets.	   First,	   I	  will	   point	   out	   that	   the	   Problem	  of	   Temporary	   Intrinsics	  cannot	  simply	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  passage	  of	  time	  and	  the	  reason	  for	  this	   is	  of	  use	   for	  highlighting	   the	  difference	  between	   the	  change	  over	   time	  (i.e.	   the	  subject	  of	  Lewis’s	  Problem)	  and	  the	  change	  (or	  passage)	  of	  time	  (i.e.	  the	  subject	  of	  McTaggart’s	  Paradox).	  	  Once	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  problems	  have	  been	  pointed	  out,	  my	  second	  aim	  will	  be	   to	   show	   that	   there	   is	   a	  way	   to	   present	   a	   Paradox	   of	   the	   passage	   of	   time	   in	  which	   some	  differences	  remain	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  Problem	  of	  Temporary	  Intrinsics.	  	  My	  work	  is	  organized	  as	  follows:	  first,	   I	  give	  a	  presentation	  of	  the	  Problem	  of	  Temporary	  Intrinsics,	  second,	  I	  show	  that	  this	  argument	  cannot	  simply	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  passage	  of	  time,	  third,	  I	  will	  present	  a	  paradox	  for	  the	  passage	  of	  time	  which	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  special	  case	  of	  the	  Problem	  of	  Temporary	  Intrinsics.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1 	  See	   for	   example	   Broad	   (1938)	   and	   Dummett	   (1960)	   for	   different	   interpretations	   of	  McTaggart’s	  Paradox	  (to	  be	  found	  in	  McTaggart	  (1908)).	  See	  Thomson	  (2001)	  for	  arguments	  against	  a	  coherent	  interpretation	  of	  McTaggart’s	  Paradox.	  2	  The	  Problem	  of	  Temporary	   Intrinsics	   first	   appeared	   in	   Lewis	   (1986).	   The	  hypothesis	   that	  McTaggart’s	  Paradox	   is	   a	   special	   case	  of	   Lewis’s	   Problem	  of	  Temporary	   Intrinsics	  has	  been	  first	   proposed	   by	   Craig	   (1998),	   and	   then	   approved	   by	   Rea	   (2003)	   and	   more	   recently	   by	  Rettler	  (2012).	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1.	  Lewis’s	  Problem	  of	  Temporary	  Intrinsics	  Lewis’s	   Problem	   of	   Temporary	   Intrinsics	   has	   been	   very	   widely	   discussed	   since	   its	   first	  publication	   in	  1986.3	  I	  believe	   that	   the	  problem	  depends	  on	   two	  pre-­‐theoretical	  hypotheses	  we	  make	  about	  things	  changing	  over	  time:	  the	  first	   is	  that	  one	  and	  the	  same	  changing	  thing	  exists	   at	   different	   instants	   of	   time;	   the	   second	   is	   that	   any	   property	   characterizing	   a	   thing	  changing	  is	  both	  temporary	  (i.e.	  it	  lasts	  for	  a	  period	  of	  time	  shorter	  than	  the	  entire	  existence	  of	  the	  changing	  thing)	  and	  intrinsic	  (i.e.	  it	  is	  possessed	  by	  the	  changing	  thing	  independently	  of	  any	  relation	  it	  may	  have	  with	  anything	  else).	  In	  my	  opinion,	  the	  two	  pre-­‐theoretic	  hypotheses	  can	  be	  schematically	  expressed	  as	  follows:	  	   1) One	  and	  the	  same	  changing	  object	  (or	  event)	  O	  exists	  at	  different	  times	  2) Any	   property	   P	   characterizing	   O’s	   change	   is	   exemplified	   both	   temporarily	   and	  intrinsically4	  	  It	  may	  be	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  when	  we	  make	  the	  second	  hypothesis	  pre-­‐theoretically,	  the	   first	   is	   already	   incorporated	   in	   it,	   i.e.	   it	   is	   assumed	   that	   O	   in	   2)	   is	   an	   object	   (or	   event)	  which	  exists	  at	  different	  instants	  of	  time.	  The	  Problem	  of	  Temporary	  Intrinsics	  depends	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  two	  hypotheses	  give	  rise	  to	  a	  contradiction.	  The	  argument	  showing	  the	  contradiction	  may	  be	  schematically	  presented	  as	  follows:	  	  1-­‐	  One	  and	  the	  same	  O	  exists	  at	  t	  and	  at	  t*	  [assumption]	  2-­‐	  Being	  bent	  is	  a	  property	  which	  characterizes	  a	  change	  in	  O,	  O	  is	  bent	  at	  t	  and	  O	  is	  straight	  (or	  not	  bent)	  at	  t*	  [assumption]	  3	  -­‐	  Therefore,	  one	  and	  the	  same	  O	  is	  intrinsically	  bent	  and	  is	  intrinsically	  straight	  (or	  not	  bent)	  	  Once	  1	  and	  2	  are	  assumed	  and	  the	  two	  pre-­‐theoretical	  hypotheses	  1)	  and	  2)	  are	  accepted,	  conclusion	  3	  follows.	  Conclusion	  3	  is	  a	  clear	  contradiction	  and	  requires	  the	  revision	  of	  at	  least	  one	  hypothesis	  grounding	  it.	  Lewis	  himself	  presents	  three	  solutions	  to	  the	  problem	  envisaged	  above.	   Each	   of	   the	   three	   solutions	   requires	   us	   to	   revise	   our	   image	   of	   what	   it	   means	   for	  something	   to	   change	   over	   time	   and	   the	   philosophical	   literature	   has	   long	   discussed	   which	  solution	   is	   best.	   I	   am	   going	   to	   present	   very	   briefly	   the	   three	   solutions	   to	   the	   Problem	   of	  Temporary	   Intrinsics:	   my	   aim	   is	   just	   to	   provide	   the	   instruments	   for	   understanding	   why	   I	  think	  that	  the	  paradox	  of	  the	  passage	  of	  time	  cannot	  simply	  be	  a	  special	  case	  of	  the	  Problem	  of	  Temporary	  Intrinsics.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  It	  is	  well	  beyond	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  work	  to	  account	  for	  the	  literature	  on	  Lewis’s	  Problem	  of	  Temporary	  Intrinsics.	  It	  may	  be	  useful	  just	  to	  remind	  that	  Lewis	  answered	  to	  objections	  to	  his	  argument	  in	  two	  publications:	  Lewis	  (1988)	  and	  Lewis	  (2002).	  4	  Lewis	   wrote	   about	   temporary	   intrinsic	   properties.	   Some	   objectors	   to	   Lewis’s	   Problem	   of	  Temporary	   Intrinsics	   pointed	   out	   that	   the	   Problem	   may	   be	   solved	   if	   we	   assume	   that	   the	  properties	  characterizing	  an	  object’s	  or	  an	  event’s	  change	  are	  instantiated	  either	  relationally	  (see	   Johnston	   (1987)	   and	   Rettler	   (2012))	   or	   intrinsically	   (see	   Lowe	   (1988)	   and	   Haslanger	  (1989)).	   This	   debate	   presupposes	   a	   subtle	   distinction	   between	   the	   temporary	   or	   intrinsic	  nature	  of	  properties	  and	  the	  temporary	  or	  intrinsic	  nature	  of	  property	  instantiation.	  I	  try	  to	  be	  neutral	  with	  respect	  to	  this	  subtle	  distinction.	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1.1	  The	  first	  solution	  to	  the	  Problem	  The	  first	  solution	  –	  the	  one	  actually	  defended	  by	  Lewis	  -­‐	  is	  to	  assume	  that	  nothing	  exists	  in	  its	   entirety	   at	   different	   instants	   of	   time	   (i.e.	   the	   solution	   is	   to	   deny	   the	   first	   pre-­‐theoretical	  hypothesis);	   according	   to	   this	   approach	   to	   the	  problem,	  what	  we	   commonly	   consider	   to	  be	  objects	   and	   events	   extended	   in	   time	   are	   constituted	   by	   temporal	   parts,	   each	   part	   being	  instantaneous	  and	  different	  from	  any	  other	  part.	  To	  use	  the	  terminology	  introduced	  by	  Lewis,	  things	   and	   events	   “perdure”,	   being	   constituted	   by	   temporal	   parts	   and	   not	   being	   wholly	  present	   at	   each	   instant	   of	   time.	   If	   we	   adopt	   the	   theory	   of	   temporal	   parts,	   the	   Problem	   of	  Temporary	   Intrinsics	   disappears	   as	   long	   as	   there	   is	   not	   something	  maintaining	   its	   identity	  through	  time	  and	  undergoing	  a	  change	  over	  time.	  	  The	   first	   solution	   does	   not	   deny	   the	   second	   hypothesis,	   which	   is	   to	   be	   considered	  vacuously	  true.	  In	  order	  to	  see	  this,	  it	  may	  be	  useful	  to	  consider	  that	  we	  consider	  the	  following	  assertion	  vacuously	  true:	  any	  fountain	  of	  youth	  rejuvenates	  whoever	  drinks	  water	  from	  it.	  As	  long	  as	  it	  is	  commonly	  believed	  there	  are	  no	  fountains	  of	  youth,	  it	  is	  taken	  for	  granted	  that	  the	  sentence	  is	  vacuously	  true.	  In	  the	  same	  way,	  as	  long	  as	  -­‐	  according	  to	  the	  first	  solution	  –	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  one	  and	  the	  same	  object	  (or	  event)	  exists	  at	  different	  instants	  of	  time,	  there	  are	  no	  properties	  characterizing	  a	  changing	  thing	  existing	  in	  its	  entirety	  at	  different	  instants	  of	  time,	  and	  the	  second	  hypothesis	  is	  therefore	  to	  be	  considered	  vacuously	  true.	  	  
1.2	  The	  second	  solution	  to	  the	  Problem	  The	   second	   solution	   is	   to	   hold	   hypothesis	   1),	   i.e.	   that	   something	   exists	   in	   its	   entirety	   at	  different	  instants	  of	  time,	  but	  to	  reject	  hypothesis	  2).	  It	  is	  claimed	  that	  something	  existing	  in	  its	  entirety	  at	  different	  instants	  of	  time	  may	  change	  over	  time	  by	  having	  different	  temporary	  properties,	  without	   assuming	   that	   the	   properties	   characterizing	   something’s	   change	   should	  be	  intrinsic.	  For	   example,	   according	   to	   the	   second	   solution,	   I	   am	   something	   existing	   in	   its	   entirety	   at	  different	  instants	  of	  time.	  Suppose,	  moreover,	  that	  I	  am	  seated	  at	  t	  and	  that	  I	  am	  not	  seated	  at	  t*,	   then	  –	  according	  to	  the	  second	  solution	  -­‐	   I	  have	  the	  relational	  property	  being-­‐seated-­‐at-­‐t	  and	  I	  do	  not	  have	  the	  relational	  property	  being-­‐seated-­‐at-­‐t*.	  The	  two	  properties	  are	  different	  relational	  properties	  and	  therefore	  there	  is	  no	  contradiction	  in	  assuming	  that	  I	  have	  one	  and	  not	  the	  other.	  	  
1.3	  The	  third	  solution	  to	  the	  Problem	  The	   third	   solution	   is	   again	   a	  way	   to	   reject	   the	   first	   hypothesis,	   and	   to	   allow	   the	   second	  hypothesis	   to	   be	   trivially	   true.	   Even	   if	   the	   third	   solution’s	   approach	   towards	   the	   two	  hypotheses	  is	  equivalent	  to	  the	  first	  solution’s	  approach,	  the	  reasons	  grounding	  it	  are	  not	  at	  all	  similar.	  While	   the	   supporter	   of	   the	   first	   solution	  maintains	   that	  what	  we	   commonly	   consider	   an	  object	   or	   event	   is	   constituted	   by	   temporal	   parts,	   the	   supporter	   of	   the	   third	   solution	   -­‐	   the	  presentist,	  according	  to	  Lewis	   -­‐	  does	  not	  maintain	   that	   there	  are	   temporal	  parts,	  she	  claims	  instead	  that	  there	  is	  only	  one	  genuine	  time	  –	  i.e.	  the	  present	  -­‐	  and	  therefore	  anything	  existing	  exists	  at	  it.	  As	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  first	  solution,	  the	  second	  hypothesis	  is	  to	  be	  considered	  trivially	  true.	  The	   third	   solution	   excludes	   things	   existing	   at	   different	   instants	   of	   time	   and	   changing	   in	   it,	  these	  claims	  are	  enough	  to	  consider	  the	  second	  hypothesis	   trivially	   true.	  As	   long	  as	  nothing	  maintain	   its	   existence	   at	   different	   instants	   of	   time,	   the	   second	   hypothesis	   is	   considered	  trivially	  true.	  	  	  
2.	  Lewis’s	  Problem	  and	  the	  Change	  (or	  Passage)	  of	  Time	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Let	  us	  now	  try	  to	  apply	  the	  Problem	  of	  Temporary	  Intrinsics	  to	  the	  passage	  of	  time.	  Just	  as	  we	   believe	   pre-­‐theoretically	   that	   objects	   and	   events	   persisting	   in	   time	   have	   temporary	  intrinsic	   properties	   (the	   assumptions	   which	   gave	   rise	   to	   Lewis’s	   Problem),	   we	   may	  illegitimately	  presume	   the	  pre-­‐theoretical	   belief	   that	   at	   least	   events	  persisting	   in	   time	  have	  temporary	  intrinsic	  temporal	  properties	  (by	  temporal	  properties	  I	  mean	  the	  properties	  “being	  present”,	   “being	   future”	   and	   “being	   past”).	   And	   we	   may	   also	   presume	   that	   the	   latter	   pre-­‐theoretic	   assumption	   gives	   rise	   to	   a	   Paradox	   which	   parallels	   the	   Problem	   of	   Temporary	  Intrinsics.	  In	  this	  section	  of	  my	  work,	  I	  want	  to	  argue	  that	  this	  parallelism	  is	  not	  adequate	  and	  that	  this	  fact	  may	  be	  useful	  for	  understanding	  an	  important	  difference	  between	  change	  over	  time	  and	  change	  of	  time.	  Let	   us	   first	   try	   to	   apply	   Lewis’s	   Problem	   of	   Temporary	   Intrinsics	   to	   the	   problem	   of	  temporal	  change.	  We	  seem	  to	  adopt	  the	  following	  two	  hypotheses:	  	   1) One	  and	  the	  same	  event	  E	  undergoing	  temporal	  change	  exists	  at	  different	  times	  2) Any	   temporal	   property	   T	   characterizing	   E’s	   temporal	   change	   is	   exemplified	   both	  temporarily	  and	  intrinsically	  	  	  A	  moment’s	  reflection	  shows	  that	  we	  are	  not	  at	  all	  pre-­‐theoretically	  disposed	  to	  accept	  the	  first	  hypothesis.	  Let	  us	  consider	  why.	  Let	  us	  suppose	  that	  an	  event	  E	   is	   instantaneous,	   i.e.	   it	  exists	  at	  a	   single	   instant	  of	   time.	  We	  still	   suppose	   that	   such	  an	  event	  undergoes	  a	   temporal	  change:	   it	   passes	   from	  being	   future,	   to	   being	  present	   and	   then	  past.	   The	   first	   hypothesis	   is	  therefore	  not	  pre-­‐theoretically	  required	  in	  order	  to	  account	  for	  the	  passage	  of	  an	  event	  from	  being	  past	  to	  being	  present	  and	  from	  being	  present	  to	  being	  future.	  It	  may	  be	  useful	  to	  reflect	  on	  the	  reason	  why	  the	  Problem	  of	  Temporary	  Intrinsics	  cannot	  simply	   be	   applied	   to	   the	   passage	   of	   time	   and	   in	   particular	   why	   the	   first	   hypothesis	   is	   not	  adequate.	  In	  my	  opinion,	  while	  we	  pre-­‐theoretically	  assume	  that	  any	  property	  characterizing	  change	  over	  time	  pertains	  primarily	  to	  objects	  or	  events	  existing	  at	  different	  instants	  of	  time,	  we	   pre-­‐theoretically	   accept	   that	   the	   properties	   “being	   past”,	   “being	   present”	   and	   “being	  future”	  concern	  primarily	  instants	  of	  time,	  which	  are	  by	  definition	  instantaneous.	  	  
3.	  The	  Change	  of	  Time	  If	  my	   observation	   is	   correct,	  we	  pre-­‐theoretically	   assume	   that	  while	   “being	   past”,	   “being	  present”	  and	  “being	  future”	  pertain	  to	  instants	  of	  time	  and	  only	  indirectly	  to	  events	  or	  objects	  (instantiated	  at	  these	  instants	  of	  time),	  the	  other	  properties	  pertain	  to	  events	  or	  objects.	  The	  problem	  of	   the	  passage	  of	   time	  may	  therefore	  be	  described	  as	  a	  problem	  concerning	  instants	  of	  time	  (and	  only	  indirectly	  objects	  or	  events):	  the	  problem	  may	  be	  described	  as	  the	  inability	  of	  an	   instant	  of	   time	  to	   instantiate	   the	  properties	  “being	  past”,	   “being	  present”	  and	  “being	  future”	  both	  intrinsically	  and	  temporarily.	  	  The	  paradox	  of	  the	  passage	  of	  time	  is	  not	  therefore	  a	  simple	  reproduction	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  temporary	  intrinsic	  change	  since	  the	  temporal	  properties	  pertain	  primarily	  to	  instants	  of	  time	  and	  not	  to	  objects	  and	  events;	  moreover	  instants	  of	  time	  changing	  their	  temporal	  properties	  are	   by	   definition	  without	   temporal	   duration,	   i.e.	   they	   are	   instantaneous,	   while	   objects	   and	  events	  changing	  over	  time	  have	  temporal	  duration.	  Now,	   these	   observations	   concerning	   the	   objects	   which	   instantiate	   temporal	   properties	  make	  the	  first	  hypothesis	  considered	  (i.e.	  1)	  in	  §2)	  inadequate,	  not	  only	  because	  the	  object	  of	  temporal	   properties	   are	   supposed	   to	   be	   instants	   of	   time,	   but	   also	   because	   they	   are	   not	  assumed	  to	  persist	  in	  time.	  We	  cannot	  simply	  assume	  that	  “one	  and	  the	  same	  instant	  of	  time	  exists	  at	  different	  times”,	  an	  instant	  of	  time	  does	  not	  exist	  at	  any	  instant	  of	  time	  different	  from	  itself.	  In	  order	  for	  an	  instant	  of	  time	  to	  change	  its	  temporal	  properties,	  it	  seems	  that	  it	  should	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be	  assumed	  that	  it	  maintains	  its	  identity	  through	  time,	  the	  first	  hypothesis	  is	  therefore	  to	  be	  changed	  as	  follows:	  	   1*)	  Every	  instant	  of	  time	  t	  maintains	  its	  identity	  through	  time	  	  The	   second	   hypothesis	   is	   that	   an	   instant	   of	   time	   instantiates	   temporal	   properties	   both	  temporarily	   (i.e.	   it	   has	   them	  at	   certain	   times	   and	  not	   at	   others)	   and	   intrinsically	   (i.e.	   it	   has	  them	   independently	   of	   any	   relation	   it	   has	  with	   any	   other	   instant	   of	   time).	   The	   second	  pre-­‐theoretic	  hypothesis	  may	  therefore	  be	  expressed	  as	  follows:	  	   2*)	  Any	  temporal	  property	  T	  characterizing	  t’s	  change	  is	  exemplified	  both	  temporarily	  and	  intrinsically	  	  1*)	  and	  2*)	  give	  rise	  to	  a	  contradiction.	  The	  argument	  may	  be	  schematically	  represented	  as	  follows:	  	  1-­‐	  t	  is	  identical	  with	  itself	  at	  any	  instant	  of	  time	  [assumption]	  2-­‐	  Being	  present	  is	  a	  temporal	  property	  which	  characterizes	  t’s	  change,	  t	  is	  present	  at	  t	  and	  t	  is	  not	  present	  at	  t’	  [assumption]	  3	  -­‐	  Therefore,	  one	  and	  the	  same	  t	  is	  intrinsically	  present	  and	  is	  intrinsically	  not	  present	  	  Once	  1	  and	  2	  are	  assumed	  and	  the	  two	  pre-­‐theoretic	  hypotheses	  1*)	  and	  2*)	  are	  accepted,	  the	  contradictory	  conclusion	  3	  follows.	  Once	  again,	  some	  of	  our	  pre-­‐theoretic	  assumptions	  are	  to	  be	  revised	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  the	  contradiction.	  I	   see	   three	  options	  which	  may	  be	  adopted	  by	  whoever	  wants	   to	   avoid	   the	   contradiction.	  The	  first	  option	  is	  obviously	  to	  reject	  hypothesis	  1*).	  But	  what	  is	  the	  reason	  for	  rejecting	  it?	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  a	  solution	  similar	  to	  the	  first	  solution	  to	  the	  Problem	  of	  Temporary	  Intrinsics	  cannot	  be	  reproduced	  here.	  It	  does	  not	  make	  sense	  to	  say	  that	  an	  instant	  of	  time	  has	  temporal	  parts.	  We	  cannot	  therefore	  say	  that	  an	  instant	  of	  time	  does	  not	  maintain	  its	  identity	  through	  time	  because	  it	  has	  different	  temporal	  parts.	  	  	  A	   presentist	  may	   reject	   the	   first	   pre-­‐theoretic	   hypothesis	   by	   claiming	   that	   an	   instant	   of	  time	  exists	  only	  at	  the	  present	  time	  without	  maintaining	  its	  identity	  through	  time.	  Even	  if	  this	  is	   a	   viable	   alternative,	   it	   has	   not	   been	   adopted	   as	   far	   as	   I	   know.	   Different	   philosophers	  maintain	   different	   theories	   concerning	   the	   identity	   of	   instants	   of	   time:	   some	   philosophers	  assume	  that	  instants	  of	  time	  exist	  eternally	  or	  atemporally	  and	  therefore	  they	  maintain	  their	  identity	   through	  time,5	  others	  assume	  that	   they	  have	  counterparts	  as	  ersatz	  worlds6	  or	   they	  exist	  in	  the	  mind	  of	  God7	  and	  this	  is	  what	  allows	  them	  to	  maintain	  their	  identity	  through	  time.	  	  If	  assumption	  1*)	  is	  accepted,	  the	  only	  way	  to	  avoid	  the	  paradox	  is	  to	  deny	  2*).	  2*)	  can	  be	  denied	  in	  principle	  by	  adopting	  two	  different	  strategies.	  It	  can	  be	  maintained	  (and	  this	  is	  the	  first	   strategy)	   that	   any	   temporal	   property	   characterizing	   an	   instant	   of	   time	   is	   temporary	  without	   being	   intrinsic.	   Or	   it	   can	   be	  maintained	   (and	   this	   is	   the	   second	   strategy)	   that	   any	  temporal	  property	  characterizing	  an	  instant	  of	  time	  is	  intrinsic	  without	  being	  temporary.	  The	  two	   strategies	   obviously	   avoid	   the	   paradox;	   it	   is	   an	   important	   and	   difficult	   philosophical	  problem	  to	  establish	  whether	  either	  of	  the	  two	  solutions	  accounts	  for	  the	  passage	  of	  time	  or	  whether	  they	  solve	  the	  paradox	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  denying	  the	  passage	  of	  time.	  I	  am	  not	  going	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  This	  is	  usually	  maintaied	  by	  supporters	  of	  the	  B-­‐Theory	  of	  time	  (see	  for	  example	  Mellor	  (1981))	  or	  of	  the	  hybrid	  A-­‐B	  Theory	  (see	  for	  example	  Smith	  (2003)).	  6	  This	  is	  suggested	  by	  Lewis	  (1986),	  and	  it	  is	  endorsed	  for	  example	  by	  Crisp	  (2007).	  7	  See	  for	  example	  Rhoda	  (2009).	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consider	   this	   problem	  here,	  my	   concern	   is	   the	   difference	   between	   the	   change	   in	   objects	   or	  events	  over	  time	  and	  the	  passage	  of	  time.8	  	  For	  the	  present	  occasion,	  let	  me	  observe	  that	  the	  proposed	  problem	  of	  the	  passage	  of	  time	  is	   not	   a	   simple	   application	   of	   Lewis’s	   Problem	   of	   Temporary	   Intrinsics.	   First,	   the	   two	  problems	  pre-­‐theoretically	  concern	  different	  subjects,	   in	  one	  case	   they	  are	  pre-­‐theoretically	  believed	  to	  concern	  objects	  and	  events	  existing	  at	  different	  instant	  of	  time,	  in	  the	  other	  case	  they	   are	   pre-­‐theoretically	   believed	   to	   concern	   instants	   of	   time,	  which	   are	   instantaneous	   by	  definition.	  Moreover	  the	  solutions	  to	  the	  two	  problems	  are	  quite	  different:	  Lewis’s	  solution	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  temporary	  intrinsics	  cannot	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  passage	  of	  time,	  moreover	   the	   presentist	   solution	   to	   the	   problem	   of	   temporary	   intrinsics	   is	   not	   actually	  applied	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   problem	   of	   temporal	   change.	   And	   the	   difference	   between	   the	  solutions	  to	  the	  two	  problems	  is	  a	  clear	  indication	  of	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  problems	  themselves.	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